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Summary 
Studies have shown that, higher welfare benefits in some local jurisdictions compared to 
others have a great impact on welfare migrations. And as a result it leads to a race to the 
bottom outcome in setting preferred levels of welfare benefits by local jurisdictions. To 
address this phenomenon most countries introduced welfare reforms. The introduction of the 
national guideline welfare norm in Norway led to the race to the bottom outcome in setting 
preferred levels of welfare benefits by local governments. This thesis evaluates the evidence 
of race to the bottom outcome triggered by the implementation of the national guideline 
welfare norm. Furthermore it investigates whether local authorities in Norway set their 
welfare benefits levels based on that of neighboring local authorities. These objectives were 
accomplished by undertaking a pre- and post-reform evaluation of the welfare benefits levels 
offered by municipalities in Norway. The study was based on secondary data on welfare 
benefits. Data on welfare benefits before the reform was derived from the study of Fiva 
(2009) while the post-reform data was derived from   Statistics Norway (SSB) database on 
welfare benefit norms that different municipalities in Norway offered after the welfare reform 
was introduced.  
The main argument was that  if many local governments responded by offering welfare 
benefits levels closer or just equal to the national guideline welfare norm it implies quite 
significant result of a model with welfare migration. With welfare migration, policymakers of 
different local authorities are influenced to observe the levels of welfare benefits being 
offered by neighboring local authorities. This leads to strategic interactions among local 
jurisdictions. The utmost credible foundation of such strategic interaction is influenced by a 
great concern about welfare migration. Large differences between welfare benefit norms have 
a huge effect on mobility of welfare recipients across local jurisdictions. 
After reviewing the theoretical effects of welfare migration, welfare benefit choices and 
strategic interactions which were quite vital for this study, the thesis assessed the responses of 
local authorities to the introduction of the national guideline welfare norm. The theoretical 
effects were of significance in this study because they provided the conduits in understanding 
the main determinants of the responses that local jurisdictions in many countries portray. 
There is a positive correlation between the amount of welfare benefits a local government 
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offers and the number of welfare recipients. Local governments that offer higher welfare 
benefits are more likely to have a large number of welfare benefit recipients than local 
governments offering less welfare benefits. This means that the number of welfare recipients 
in a given local jurisdiction will increase because of welfare migration. Poor people will 
migrate from low welfare benefits municipalities to high welfare benefits municipalities in 
order to maximize both utility and income. As a result, local governments with higher welfare 
benefit levels will respond by reducing their welfare benefits. This means that the welfare 
benefits levels and the share of the beneficiaries will reduce as the local governments respond 
by offering low levels of welfare benefits.  
With strategic interactions, a local authority first observes the welfare benefits of neighboring 
local authorities before deciding its welfare benefits level. This means the choice of welfare 
benefit of a jurisdiction is greatly influenced by the levels of welfare benefits that neighboring 
jurisdictions are offering. This is called welfare competition because the decision on welfare 
benefit level is a function of the benefit levels set by other municipalities. To avoid attracting 
more welfare benefits recipients to their municipalities, many local governments end up 
offering the same level or a level much lower than what neighboring local authorities are 
offering.  
In a model with welfare migration, a significant result will be convergence of most local 
jurisdictions’ on the level of welfare benefits to a mutual national level of welfare benefit set 
by the authorities. The numbers of welfare recipients’ across the country differs with how 
generous the local jurisdictions have been before the welfare reform took place. Before the 
welfare reform was introduced, many of the municipalities were offering welfare benefits 
levels which were above or below the national guideline. After 2002, most of the local 
governments converged to the national guideline norm implying quite significant result of a 
model with welfare migration. A lot of municipalities in the southern part of the country 
preferred to offer similar levels of welfare benefits. This trend shows there is a significant 
strategic interaction between neighboring local jurisdictions in setting levels of welfare 
benefits. It further demonstrates the existence of a race to the bottom in setting welfare 
benefits levels triggered by welfare migration and strategic interactions by local jurisdictions. 
The race to the bottom outcome and strategic interactions among jurisdictions had great 
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impacts on the welfare benefits choices after the national guideline for welfare benefits was 
introduced. 
In this paper, I could have tested if there was a positive correlation between the welfare 
benefits norm levels being offered by different local governments and the net migration of 
people who are welfare benefit recipients. This is because people relocate from one 
jurisdiction to another for various reasons like availability of educational facilities and better 
employment opportunities other than higher levels of welfare benefits.  Lack of net migration 
data of different municipalities motivated to investigate the evidence of race to the bottom 
outcome in implementing the national guideline welfare norm in Norway after the welfare 
reform was implemented. 
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1 Introduction  
The effects of higher welfare benefits in some local jurisdictions as compared to other local 
jurisdictions have a great impact on welfare migrations. As a result it leads to a race to the 
bottom outcome in setting preferred levels of welfare benefits by local jurisdictions. The “race 
to the bottom” outcome in trying to set up a local jurisdiction`s preferred level of welfare 
benefit is greatly affected by two scenarios. The first scenario is the presence of welfare 
migration. With welfare migration, many local jurisdictions are greatly concerned by the 
pooling of welfare recipients in their jurisdictions. This will increase their total costs hence 
they pay great attention by being strict on the levels of welfare benefits they offer. Instead, 
they prefer to offer levels lower than what the society desires thereby implementing a race to 
the bottom outcome in setting their preferred level of welfare benefits.  Then the second 
scenario is how local jurisdictions come up with desired levels of welfare benefits. They 
observe what their neighbors are offering to come up with their own desired level. This is 
called strategic interactions among municipalities. As a result neighboring municipalities will 
have similar levels of welfare benefits. This avoids pooling of poor people in their 
jurisdictions hence implying a race to the bottom outcome (Dahlberg & Edmark, 2008).  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the evidence of race to the bottom outcome triggered 
by the implementation of the national guideline welfare norm. Furthermore it investigates 
whether local authorities in Norway set their welfare benefits levels based on that of 
neighboring local authorities. These objectives were accomplished by undertaking a pre- and 
post-reform evaluation of the welfare benefits levels offered by municipalities in Norway. 
The study was based on secondary data on welfare benefits. Data on welfare benefits before 
the reform was derived from the study of Fiva (2009) while the post-reform data was derived 
from   Statistics Norway (SSB) database on welfare benefit norms that different 
municipalities in Norway offered after the welfare reform was introduced.  
The main argument is therefore: if many local governments responded by offering welfare 
benefits levels closer or just equal to the national guideline welfare norm it implies quite 
significant result of a model with welfare migration. This is supported by many publications. 
For example the Brueckner (2000) and Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) papers indicated that a 
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race to the bottom in the choice of welfare benefits levels by local governments is triggered 
by welfare migration.  
According to Brueckner (2000) the race to the bottom outcome in this context does not mean 
that local governments will offer levels of welfare benefits that are mimicked by least 
generous local governments. Neither does it mean they offer very minimum levels that are 
unconstitutional in the sense that the poor will not be able to survive on the welfare benefits. 
But it refers to the decrease in levels of welfare benefits which is triggered by the great 
concern about welfare migration without necessarily trying to worsen the situation of the poor 
people in a society. As a result of welfare migration, policymakers of local governments will 
end up choosing the level of benefit lower than what they would choose in the absence of 
welfare migration. When local governments choose their level of welfare benefits they 
consider what their neighboring jurisdictions are offering this is called strategic interactions 
among municipalities (Brueckner, 2000). 
Welfare migration is relocation that is experienced when welfare beneficiaries relocate from 
low welfare benefit municipalities to higher welfare benefit municipalities. Welfare 
beneficiaries are people who are in need of financial assistance to be able to survive. 
According to Brueckner (2000) and Borjas (1999) welfare beneficiaries relocate in order to 
maximize their income and improve their levels of standards of living in a desired 
jurisdiction. How welfare benefits levels affect welfare migration can be well explained by 
responses of the rich people in local jurisdiction when the rich people decide to increase the 
welfare benefit level. They weigh the altruistic gains of assisting the poor people in their local 
jurisdiction against their enlarged tax burden they will face. If there is no migration, the tax 
burden becomes huge because the portion of the poor people who are in need will receive 
higher levels of welfare benefits (Brueckner, 2000).  
Brueckner (2000) concur that in the presence of migration, if the local government is 
generous and offers a higher level of welfare benefits then the poor people`s number will 
increase. This is because of the attractiveness of the level of benefit being offered in that 
jurisdiction. In this case, the tax burden will increase sharply because the higher level of 
benefits will attract a lot of welfare recipients who migrate into that jurisdiction as compared 
to if there was no relocation of the poor people. Therefore, the generous behavior of local 
governments will lead to more costs being caused by welfare migration. This will create 
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benefit spillovers which are covered with the state grants, grants that municipalities receive 
from the state. This might cause the non-poor people to relocate to local jurisdictions that 
offer them low levels of welfare benefit to avoid the huge tax burden. But however local 
governments escape becoming welfare magnets by being not so generous and they resort to 
the race to the bottom outcome in setting levels of welfare benefits in their local jurisdictions 
(Brueckner, 2000).  
1.1 Theoretical Perspectives 
The effects of welfare benefit levels on welfare migration is varied in the sense that some 
studies have come up with huge effects being borne on welfare migration due to different 
levels of welfare benefits offered by different local jurisdictions (Dahlberg and Edmark, 
2008). Authors like Gramlich (1984) and Enchautegui (1997) came up with very strong 
positive and consistent evidence in their studies, Walker (1994) and Levine & Zimmerman 
(1999) found no effects of offering varied levels welfare benefits by different local 
jurisdictions. 
Fiva (2009) found a consistent estimate of the level of welfare migration using data from 
1995 up to 2002 of welfare benefits paid to single individuals in Norway. I base my study on 
views and empirical investigations from Fiva (2009). In his study he highlighted the effects of 
welfare policy on residential choices. Vast literature has shown that different models have 
been in different countries, but most of them they came up with similar results. Dahlberg and 
Edmark (2008) found a race-to the bottom scenario after they applied a model to the 
resettlement of refugees in Sweden and it shows huge effects of higher welfare benefits on 
relocation of refugees in Sweden. Borjas (1999) came up with similar results when he applied 
the welfare migration model in the different states in the U.S. Therefore it shows that race to 
the bottom outcome acts as an incentive for the local jurisdictions to be stricter with welfare 
benefits. This means they try to lower them as much as possible so as not attract welfare 
benefits recipients and avoid welfare competition among local governments by increasingly 
being less generous (Meyer, 2000). 
According to Wheaton (1998) the problems that are normally faced are: what does welfare 
recipients expected to do when faced with local governments’ differences in levels of welfare 
benefits they offer and attractiveness they portray. How do different local governments react 
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when they are challenged by different responses of welfare recipients? Does decentralization 
of welfare benefits have effects on the level of welfare benefits and the amount of welfare 
recipients in a jurisdiction? The underlying extend of worry is that, there is a major variation 
of choices of residential jurisdictions decisions of welfare benefit recipients. As a result, this 
will affect decisions of local governments in providing these welfare benefits. Hence the 
consequences will be the behavior of the local governments, they will respond quickly by 
providing competitive low levels of welfare benefits in a country therefore revolting to the 
race to the bottom in setting of welfare benefits levels. And the significance attached to this 
variation shows different behavioral patterns portrayed among different local governments 
and is such an important factor in determining the level of benefits provided by the local 
governments (Wheaton, 1998). 
1.2  Ways of financing municipalities 
According to Johansen (1971) he defined a municipality as an administrative entity 
subordinate to the State, which has a defined territory and authority to decide its own 
management wholly or partly by means of its own government structures. Its defined territory 
is also known as its jurisdiction and the entity that governs the municipality is known as a 
local government. So the local government has the power to decide on issues within its local 
jurisdiction. The foundation of municipal self-government in Norway was recognized by 
legislation in 1837, this has been reviewed several times but the core ideologies haven`t 
changed. Therefore the municipalities signify the citizens in their community, they have the 
freedom to launch and uphold legal activities which are needed by its citizens (Johansen, 
1971).  
Johansen (1971) further on says Norway is one of the countries that enjoy the decentralization 
of the municipalities. Some countries in Europe also have similar situations for example 
Switzerland and Netherlands. These municipalities are financed differently depending on the 
system of their countries. Different countries have various ways they use to implement 
financing of different municipal activities. These ways range from transfers made direct from 
the state to the municipalities and this can include either conditional transfers or unconditional 
transfers. Conditional in the sense that particular procedure has to be followed or the transfer 
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will be directed towards a certain municipal activity. An example of an activity can be the 
construction of municipal roads and building of schools and hospitals.  
On the other hand unconditional transfers give the municipality freedom to choose what it 
thinks is suitable given the transfer. The unconditional transfers have no directives but are 
used based on certain factors like the population size of the municipality, the income levels 
within the municipality and heterogeneous needs of the population in a municipality. This is 
to ensure that the transfer will be more valuable if it is used for an activity that is really in 
demand by the citizens of that municipality. Some other forms of financing are sharing tax 
revenue between the municipality and the state. With this type of taxation the state has the 
authority to lay down the rates and rules to be applied within the municipality. All the tax 
revenue collected in this way is shared between the state and the municipality depending on 
the rules of the state, which means that the state decides on the percentages each of them will 
get. Another form is that of municipal taxes on separate bases. With this system the 
municipality and the state have different shared tax bases between them such that either the 
municipality or the state capitalizes on the tax base which they have set. This means only one 
tax base will be exploited exclusively by the municipality or by the state (Johansen, 1971).  
And last but not least imposing “Taxes on the same bases as the state but with rates laid down 
on a municipal basis and municipal taxes on separate bases” (Johansen,1971. p. 353). With 
this system the state imposes income tax but in addition to this, the tax payers in a 
municipality also pay tax to the municipality which is calculated on the same tax base but 
depending on the rates laid down by the local government. Which means total taxation from 
each and every municipality differs depending on the rates selected by its local government. 
This is the basic type of financing that is implemented by municipalities in Norway (Johansen 
1971). 
Johansen (1971) says that, in Norway the state imposes income tax, with the tax being shared 
among the state, municipality and the province such that taxpayers pay tax to the municipality 
calculated on the same tax base. This shows that local taxes are highly controlled by the 
center. The municipalities collect revenue from income tax and some from charging property 
tax within their jurisdictions. But they have to implement the law of taxes where there are 
upper and lower limits of the amount of tax to be charged. This means municipalities are free 
to choose any percentage between the upper and the lower limits but many municipalities opt 
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for the upper limit. And in addition the municipalities receive revenues from the state in the 
form of grants. These grants are offered to municipalities to cater for shortfalls of their 
spending that is the interstate benefit spillovers.  
The main reason why particularly in Norway there are certain limits for tax percentages which 
municipalities imposes on income tax and property tax is to avoid municipalities from having 
too different tax levels. This will result in pooling of labor and capital in low tax charging 
municipalities hence creating large inequalities between different municipalities. The other 
incentive was to equalize the service of provision of public goods all over the whole country 
(Johansen, 1971).  
According to Oates (1999) differentiating which instruments and functions that are more 
viable with the centralized governments and which functions performs well under 
decentralized government then allocating them among different levels of governments helps 
to achieve the first best outcomes. This can be achieved through understanding the best ways 
for revenue collection and expenditure responsibilities in a country which is known as fiscal 
federalism (Oates, 1999).   
Hindriks & Myles (2006) says a decentralized system is a situation where there is a multi-
level government that is the local governments are given power to provide services in their 
local jurisdictions. Therefore in such circumstances the main task of the central government is 
to intervene if there is market failure for example if an economic activity in one local 
jurisdiction creates an externality that has the effect on other jurisdictions without their 
consent. The outcome will be inefficiency and then the central government has to intervene to 
so as to increase efficiency and to improve equity (Hindriks and Myles, 2006). “Economic 
efficiency in such transfer programs itself requires a basic role for the central government to 
correct the distortions inherent in a wholly decentralized program of assistance to the poor. In 
addition, there are other equity and efficiency arguments that, depending on a society`s 
values, may imply a further rationale for central intervention.” (Brown and Oates, 1987 p309)   
According to Musgrave (1959), the state must be responsible for redistribution of public 
goods such that public goods will be available for all people over the whole nation. He 
divided the public sector into three main divisions which are the distribution, the stabilization 
and the allocation. He assumed that the central roles of the state in the public sector are to 
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redistribute and maintain public goods. It was because if the local governments are given that 
task they will encounter a kind of adverse selection which means the redistribution will create 
incentives that attract the poor whilst rejecting the taxpayers who are the contributors of the 
economy for the well-being of the poor. This was also supported by Waldsin (1991).  
The decentralized governments that are the local and regional governments were assumed to 
provide or allocate the public goods in accordance with the local preferences of the 
municipalities. This was so because of the advantage of local knowledge they have of the 
people in their municipalities therefore they could deliver the required levels in their local 
jurisdictions (Oates, 2012).   
Hindriks & Myles (2006) further says however if the public good is obliged to serve the 
whole economy for example defense, then in this situation resolutions have to be made at the 
state  level to achieve equity and efficiency because all people around the nation must have 
the same access to the same public good. On the other hand local jurisdictions make the most 
out of local preferences to improve efficiency and equality if resolutions to provide public 
goods like elderly care, child benefits and school quality, are made at the local levels. This is 
because they take into account more precise information and provide what exactly is needed 
by the people and thereby avoiding wasting of available resources. This differs if the 
resolutions were made by the central government. In this case, differentiation in providing the 
different levels of public good among different municipalities will be heavily resisted by 
policymakers of different local governments hence it creates political pressures between the 
state and the local jurisdictions. However the relationship between a central government and 
decentralized local governments has proved to be efficient and provides equity within the 
national government and provides huge macroeconomic consistence of the whole economy 
(Hindriks and Myles, 2006) 
According to the Tiebout hypothesis, consumers or individuals have heterogeneous 
preferences, and to achieve efficiency different local jurisdictions have to come up with their 
local preferred preferences. These should be provided at different levels because of different 
tastes and preferences that different municipalities have. Since these decisions are acceptable 
at different levels, automatically it’s unavoidable that financing should be determined at the 
same level too. This is because imposing a tax policy that is identical throughout the whole 
economy will lead to transfers across local jurisdictions. Local municipalities that demand 
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high levels of the public good compared to their tax base would run a shortage to meet up 
their demands and those municipalities demanding low levels would generate surplus. Hence 
this will create transfers over the jurisdictions which may not be justifiable, efficient and 
politically adequate and it may lead to the loss of welfare over the economy.  
However, having the capability to distinguish different levels of public goods that are really in 
need among different local jurisdictions gives a more direct and impact allocation of 
resources to the people who really require them. And further will achieve equity among 
different local jurisdiction and improve efficiency at local government levels (Hindriks and 
Myles, 2006) 
According to the Tiebout model local governments are viewed as markets that compete in 
providing local public goods that are most preferred by consumers. In his model footloose 
consumers migrate from one municipality to another with the objective of utility 
maximization and choosing a municipality that offers their desired levels of local public 
goods. By migrating from one municipality to another it means they efficiently vote with their 
feet. And in a way encouraging the competent distribution of resources and disclosing their 
sensitivities for the provision of public goods (Oates, 2012). For example in Switzerland the 
decentralization system has allowed for a flexible tax base, imposing different levels of 
income tax over the country. The system has survived because of the different levels of local 
public goods that are provided by their local governments. To such an extent that even when 
the tax is high but people will remain in that local jurisdiction because of the preferred local 
public goods (Dafflon & Perritaz, 2002).  
Although decentralized governments have a big role to play in the efficient distribution of 
resources within the public sector, they normally come across severe limitations in trying to 
solve further public sector tasks (Oates, 2012). For example they can face a challenge in 
trying to allocate income from the rich people to the poor in local jurisdiction. This can 
contribute and give strong encouragement for the rich people to basically relocate to another 
local jurisdiction which has more preferred financial treatment for them. In a situation where 
there is such mobility of taxpayers and welfare recipients, the local governments have the 
intention of creating magnets for the rich people. So that they will create clusters of rich 
people and evade all prospective welfare recipients thereby creating welfare competition 
among municipalities (Oates, 2012).  
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The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the literature review and 
theoretical background of the models which were influential for this paper. This section 
highlights the models of welfare migration and choice of benefits levels and reactions of local 
jurisdictions. Section 3 goes on to outline the Norwegian special case, its empirical 
background and the evidence of strategic interactions among local jurisdictions. Section 4 
presents and discusses the data, collected from SSB websites of the welfare benefit levels that 
were paid by different municipalities from 2002 up to 2008. Section 5 outlines an 
econometric model that could have been used if all the data required was available. And 
finally section 6 has the conclusion of the paper. 
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2 Literature review and theoretical 
background 
Welfare migration and strategic interactions among local jurisdictions are as a result of effects 
of higher welfare benefits. Higher welfare benefits attract more welfare recipients in a 
jurisdiction namely welfare migration. When this happens, local governments react by 
lowering their welfare benefit levels which implies a race to the bottom outcome and 
strategically interact with their neighbors (Brueckner, 2000). To highlight these economic 
models of welfare migration and strategic interactions of local jurisdictions I will concentrate 
on two models below. These models were of interest to motivate the discussion of this paper. 
The first model is the welfare migration model by Borjas (1999). The second model is the 
race to the bottom in setting welfare benefits by Dahlberg & Edmark (2008) 
2.1 Welfare migration 
According to Borjas (1999), states that offer higher welfare benefits are crowded mostly by 
immigrants who are welfare benefits beneficiaries rather than non-recipients immigrants and 
the inborn citizens. As a result the sensitivity to welfare benefits levels is greater in 
immigration population as compared to the inborn citizens’ population. This is mainly 
because immigrants who do not have a permanent place to stay move from one state to 
another hence their fixed costs are much less than those who are natives. The welfare benefits 
they gain outset the migration costs they incur. This is because they would have incurred large 
costs of migrating from their country to the United States in the first place. The costs incurred 
by natives are huge in two senses. The first one being that moving away from your close 
family is costly because if you move you will miss the socialization that you normally have 
with your family. Secondly moving to a new place after having been staying at the same place 
for a long time is costly because you feel attached to a place the longer you have stayed at that 
same place. Therefore the difference in the welfare benefits being offered by different states 
does not motivate the inborn citizens to relocate because they are easily swamped by the 
relocations costs. These lucrative welfare benefits to immigrants have become magnets in 
some states of the U.S attracting immigrants who could be in some other countries, or 
migrants who should have emigrated from the U.S after they couldn`t succeed in getting a job 
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and settle and be able to financially assist themselves in the U.S. These high welfare benefits 
act as a safety net and have a huge impact when immigrants are choosing a residential place to 
stay. Because of the idea of income maximization, low skilled immigrants and immigrants 
who already receive the benefits end up being in the right state. This means that they end up 
in a state that offers them high levels of benefits where they maximize their income. This has 
resulted in severe economic burden to those states that are liberal in offering high welfare 
benefits. This geographical organization would have been the same for natives if there were 
no relocation costs. Because of perfect mobility where there are no costs of moving from one 
state to another, clusters of least skilled natives or workers are established in the states that 
offers the lavish welfare benefits.  
To elaborate the thoughts on how natives come up with a state they desire to stay in, Borjas 
(1999) came up with a model. In his model he assumed two states, state 1 and state 2 that are 
randomly occupied by natives which mean natives freely choose which state they want to 
reside in. The model shows the association between log wages and skills in each state which 
was given by  
                                                   log          
  representing the state that is either state 1 or state 2,    is the worker`s income in a state and 
    is the mean of log incomes in a state and    measures deviations from mean log income 
and their variance is measurable. “It is useful to interpret    as a measure of relative ability or 
skills that are perfectly transferable across regions, so that the parameter     gives the rate of 
return to skills in state   ” (Borjas, 1999 p. 610). And he has a postulation that in-born citizens 
and immigrants always want to maximize earnings. And he rated the states such that    in 
state 2 is greater that    in state 1. In addition to that each state is obliged to give a minimum 
amount log   of earnings to all the people in their local jurisdictions. Without considering 
whether a person is a citizen or not they all receive a minimum amount of earnings so as for 
them to be equal. The first case would assume that there are no migrations costs which mean 
people can relocate from one state to another without incurring costs. As indicated on the 
diagram below (figure 1) taken from Borjas (1999) , if state 1offers better welfare benefits 
that is log   which is higher than log    being offered in state 2, the whole group of people 
with skills between    and     would prefer to work in state 1. On the other hand all those 
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with skills less than     would opt for state 1 welfare system since it favors them. Then the 
rest, meaning those with skills greater than    will opt for state 2 since their skills are better 
off by working in state 2. Hence it shows that since state 1 offers greater welfare benefits than 
state2, all less skilled people will end up migrating to state 1 creating a populated  state 
attracted by the higher level of welfare benefits as shown on the diagram below. 
 
 
 Fig. 1: Costless welfare migration between states.  
 
On the other hand another situation occurs in a similar way but people will be populated in a 
different state as shown on the diagram below (figure 2) taken from Borjas (1999). Now let 
the minimum log earnings in state 2 log   be more than what would be earned in state 1 that 
is log  . The population with skills less than    will opt for state 2 `s welfare system as 
illustrated on the diagram below. Whilst those with skills between    and    will work in 
state 1 and those with skills above    will work in state 2. 
state 1
state 2
works in state2
works in state 
1
receives welfare in
state 1
log    
      
  
  
log   
log 
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 Fig. 2: Welfare migration between states. 
This implies that whenever there is freedom of movement a state that provides the uppermost 
welfare benefits will be the one merely populated most by inborn citizens as indicated by the 
two diagrams above.  
Borjas (1999) went on to assume a case with relocation costs that are quite huge from one 
state to another; in which it will be quite expensive to relocate. The relocation costs are 
denoted by   which is that part a person deducts from his earnings to cater for the relocation 
costs. However if a person relocates from state 1 to state 2, he has to pay     for the 
relocation costs to relocate to state 2. And he postulates a fixed   for all the people in a state 
such that the relocation costs are the same for everyone.  
In the first scenario he assumed higher welfare benefits in the relocated state 2, than the 
former state 1 where the person was born in to see how inborn citizens decide which state to 
reside in. As illustrated on the diagram below (figure 3) from Borjas (1999) the relocation 
costs have an effect of increasing the wage –skills up in state 1 and that affects the state 1 
curve to shift upwards. This has an effect of increasing the number of people who would 
prefer to reside in their state of inborn state 1 rather than being attracted by higher welfare 
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benefits in state 2.The relocation costs would costs them more than what they will benefit in 
state 2 hence some of the potential migrants will end up remaining in state 1.Therefore it 
shows that the relocation costs have an impact but which is not that high to keep everyone in 
their original state. Though some people who could have relocated were discouraged and 
remained in state 1. 
 
Fig. 3:Welfare migration between states. 
The second scenario demonstrates how people from state 2 would choose a state to reside in. 
First and foremost before the relocation costs were introduced the fraction of people who 
were relocating where those who were less skilled, attracted by higher welfare benefits 
offered in state 1. With the introduction of relocation costs, all those who had the potential to 
relocate are brought to a halt because of the huge relocation costs. This occurs to such an 
extend that even those who are less skilled and who have the potential to migrate will prefer 
to stay in state 2 and receive the welfare benefits being offered in state 2 as shown and 
explained on the diagram below (figure 4). 
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Fig. 4: Welfare migration between states. 
Hence the two scenarios above have shown that the introduction of relocation costs have 
effects and as a result they give different decisions that natives take when considering which 
state to reside in. In the two cases above it proves that if the relocation costs are huge, even 
those who are least skilled will opt to remain in their state of origin and receive benefits being 
offered there. And if the costs are not so huge some will relocate to higher welfare benefits 
states whilst those with better skills will opt to remain. 
The two scenarios conclude with, the inborn citizens will be greatly distributed throughout the 
whole country and receive welfare benefits where they are. On the other hand the immigrants 
will be populated in the states that provide the highest welfare benefits (Borjas, 1999).   
2.2 Choice of benefit levels and reactions 
How these states set up their welfare benefits is an interesting issue. Also interesting is how 
these states try to match their benefit levels with neighboring jurisdictions to avoid 
competition and in trying to minimize migration. So the question would be because of the 
competitive pressure from other jurisdictions what would be the response of policymakers, do 
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they reduce or increase what they would offer as compared to what they intended to offer?. 
Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) studied the extend of the impact of welfare benefits levels being 
offered in neighboring municipalities on a municipality when it tries to establish its own 
standard level of welfare benefits in Sweden. As indicated in Borjas (1999) higher welfare 
benefits states would be mostly populated by welfare recipients. Because of this mobility of 
welfare recipients, jurisdictions would prefer not to offer higher welfare benefits as this would 
attract a lot of welfare recipients. The level of welfare benefits being offered would be far 
much below what could have been offered in the absence of mobility of welfare beneficiaries. 
Even if the mobility of poor people does not exist, interactions between the various 
jurisdictions proved that no one wants to be a common pool for the welfare benefits 
recipients. Hence both circumstances would lead to a “race to-the-bottom” scenario in trying 
to set up the level of welfare benefits in local jurisdictions across the nations (Dahlberg and 
Edmark, 2008).  
The decisions to observe other local jurisdictions` welfare benefits levels act as a great factor 
in setting up a level of support for the poor people in a jurisdiction. But at the same time it 
creates welfare competition and evades the magnetism scenario. Policymakers respond to 
welfare migration by providing less than what could have been offered in the absence of 
welfare migration. 
The extend of the effect of interactions between different local jurisdictions in trying to 
establish the levels of welfare benefits was tested using the equation below 
                                                 =γ∑              +   
   being the benefit level being offered in local government  ,    being benefit levels offered 
in other local governments other than local government   ,     indicates that these local 
jurisdictions are not the same.     are weights, measuring the value that local jurisdiction   
gives to the benefits in the other local jurisdiction. “   is a matrix of socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics for local government   with the associated parameter vector  , 
and    is the error term” (Dahlberg and Edmark, 2008, p1194).    being the parameter of 
interest, that signifies the gradient of the local jurisdiction`s reaction function. The value of   
signifies the effect of considerate association between the local governments. If the value of   
is close to zero it means there would be little interaction between the local government   and 
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other local governments that have been valued differently from zero. But as   distance itself 
more from zero it implies that there is great association between the local government and 
other local governments being considered given that they have been valued differently from 
zero. Investigations in this area of study have found a positive and statistically confident value 
of  (Dahlberg and Edmark, 2008). But the econometric problem associated with the equation 
is that the levels of other local government’s welfare benefits are determined within, a result 
of considerate association among them which means they are transferred through the outcome 
variable namely the welfare benefit level. 
Their empirical work showed a positive and statistically significant  . This proved that if 
surrounding  local jurisdictions lowers their welfare benefits by 100 SEK the municipality 
trying to set up its benefit level responded by lowering its welfare benefit level by an estimate 
of 41SEK which showed strategic behavior among different municipalities (Dahlberg and 
Edmark, 2008). 
In their paper Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) they took advantage of the introduction of a 
policy participation in the late 1980s and early 1990s on how refugees were resettled in 
Swedish communities. It was because refugees are highly entitled to welfare benefits when 
they get resettled. They applied their empirical data on the model that comprised of two 
counties to see the effects of the welfare game. Their model is similar to Brown and Oates 
(1987) model. The model was composed of two counties, county A and county B. Each 
county is comprised of M number of non-poor consumers also referred as rich people who 
permanently reside in their counties which means they do not migrate between counties.  
These rich people are the people who decide the level of the welfare benefits in their counties, 
taking into consideration the preferences of the poor people. The fact that they do not migrate 
brings an interesting idea on how they react to a high tax burden in trying to equalize 
distribution of income between them and the poor people in their local jurisdiction. N is the 
number of poor people in both counties, with    being the number of poor people in county A 
and    the number of poor people in county B. These groups of poor people they are mobile, 
they can relocate from one county to another with no relocation costs. They are benefits 
recipients and they work in low earning jobs. Their earnings reveal marginal efficiency of the 
least skilled labor in the county they reside in. Their total population in two counties is given 
as    +   =   within the groups of non-poor and the poor people, the people in each group 
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are identical in the sense that their preferences are similar.  Their pre-transfer incomes and 
pre-tax incomes are just the same for each and every individual. Therefore utility derived by 
the non-poor people in a jurisdiction depends on the after tax income they will spend on their 
selves and the income transfer they make to the poor people in their jurisdiction (Brown and 
Oates, 1987).   
The model postulates the utility for the rich in each county is equal, which means their utility 
function is just equal as well and is given by:   (  ,   ) .    representing county A or county B. 
   is the rich people`s consumption spending in each county and their earnings are represented 
by     So their income is assumed to cover for their total expenditures and the benefits that the 
least skilled people receive in their respective counties. Therefore in a case where mobility of 
the least skilled people is absent, the rich people would set the benefit level at a level that is 
sustained by their income. This is because they have to fund their expenditures and the 
welfare benefits of a fixed number of poor people in their county.  
The budget constraint for the non-poor in both counties is similar. This means that the welfare 
cost of the rich resident in county A is denoted by multiplying         divided by the number 
of the non-poor people   , and in county B is denoted by      divided by the   the number 
of the non-poor people. This shows that the rich people in a county are concerned about the 
poor people in their county only. On the other hand if the least-skilled people freely migrate 
from one county to another the situation becomes different because the number of the least-
skilled in each county tends to vary at each given time.  
The number of the poor people in a jurisdiction is of great concern. If the number of poor 
people in a municipality is quite low, then non-poor people can easily afford to raise enough 
income to assist the poor in their jurisdiction. Therefore those poor people who fortunately 
find themselves in such types of jurisdictions will receive higher welfare benefits as compared 
to jurisdictions with large numbers of poor people (Brown and Oates, 1987). The decision of 
the rich to establish a certain level of welfare benefits in county A is strongly influenced by 
two factors. One factor is the number of poor people in its jurisdiction and another factor is 
that it also depends on the behavior of the mobility of the poor people and the level of welfare 
benefits in county B. Meaning that an increase in    (welfare benefit in county A) to a level 
above    would attract the least-skilled people from county B to migrate to county A, 
creating clusters of poor people in county B. Therefore in trying to set up their welfare 
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benefits levels both counties play a welfare game in which both counties observes the other 
county`s welfare benefit level as static. They then set up a desired welfare benefit level in 
comparison to the welfare benefit level of another county. Both counties would try to avoid 
clustering of poor people in their counties by not offering higher welfare benefits than the 
other county, which means they always prefer to offer less than what is offered in a county of 
comparison. 
With the presence of migration both counties views the benefit level of the other county and 
set up a welfare benefit level lower than what is offered in another county or just at the same 
level. This shows that the welfare benefit level in this case is lower than the case where there 
is migration. And an increase in the welfare benefit level triggers the clustering and increases 
total costs of a county as compared to the non-migration case. Without the existence 
migration the rich just set up the level of welfare benefit that take into consideration the least-
skilled people`s preferences and their own level of preferred expenditures.  But in a case 
where people freely migrate between counties we expect strategic interactions among counties 
in monitoring total costs and setting welfare benefit levels that keep them well off and as a  
result creating a race to the bottom scenario in establishing welfare benefit level in their 
respective counties. 
Dahlberg & Edmark (2008) when they applied their model to see if the refuge resettlement 
program had an effect on setting the level of welfare benefits across different municipalities in 
Sweden they found a positive effect. The results showed that after the introduction program of 
the refugees most of them remained as welfare benefits beneficiaries. 24 percent of the 
refugees were still welfare beneficiaries after having been stayed in Sweden for a period 
between 7 to 16 years, which was quite a significant figure (Dahlberg & Edmark, 2008). And 
most of the refugees migrated to the big cities; Goteborg, Stockholm and Malmo after their 
introduction programs were finished. This increased the number of welfare beneficiaries in 
these cities which was strongly discouraged in the first place. This triggered municipalities to 
react to the levels of welfare benefits they were offering (Dahlberg & Edmark, 2008).  
The two models above suggest that welfare migration is a big concern of the local 
jurisdictions. Many local jurisdictions will end up decreasing their level of welfare benefits 
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3 Norwegian special case 
3.1 Empirical background 
Norway is one of the countries that enjoy a decentralized welfare system provided by the 
local governments while its funding is highly centralized. The funding is mainly controlled by 
the state. In the Norwegian set up the local governments provides public goods like culture, 
infrastructure, elderly care, health-care, both primary and secondary education and as well 
kindergartens. Local governments got the mandate to provide assistance to the poor people in 
their municipalities for more than 150 years now. It was because the local governments know 
their population far much better, and knows the conditions in which they survive better than 
the state (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006).  
According to Borge (2006) local governments funding comes from taxes shared by the 
government, some local governments have property taxes and in addition grants granted by 
the central government.  The actual fact that the funding is highly centralized was meant to 
provide equivalent economic opportunities to all local governments. This was to ensure that 
they will not vary too much in the services they provide and to encourage provincial strategy 
objectives. Equalization was achieved through setting the same tax base for all such that all 
local governments have the same tax base. As a result, migration wouldn’t be as a result of 
different tax bases but due to some other reasons or differences in public goods provided by 
different municipalities (Borge, 2006).  
3.2 Costs and financing of municipalities 
Different municipalities incur different costs when providing services to their people. They 
depend on population sizes since all local governments have different numbers of people 
living in their communities. Elderly care, child care and education are mostly influenced by 
age composition. If these welfare services groups of people are large then we expect an 
increase in welfare benefits. This is because welfare benefits take quite a fraction of the local 
government`s budget. A local jurisdiction with a high fraction of elderly people in its 
population uses a lot of resources for elderly care more than other services. Hence a 
municipality composed of young people and lots of children uses lots of resources for 
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education and child care.  Therefore the number of the elderly and the number of children in a 
municipality leads to such competition between welfare services and welfare benefits. A large 
fraction of these groups of people in a municipality`s population really matters a lot to the 
political decision makers (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006).  
Borge (2006) says unemployment as a factor has a huge impact on social welfare benefits. 
Local governments situated in the northern part of Norway and some small municipalities are 
given additional grants. This acts as an incentive to encourage population growth by 
providing improved services in these areas better than other municipalities and encouraging 
employment as well. This was also supported by Wheaton`s (2000) model and his hypothesis 
of private income level of a municipality as an important characteristic in some 
municipalities, highlighting the significant argument for redistribution to the poor people 
being justified as an incentive to reduce negative externalities in a municipality. These 
negative externalities can include crimes in a local jurisdiction because of poverty, and this 
reduction of crimes is a significant factor. As a result the rich people in a municipality are 
motivated to redistribute to the poor in their local jurisdiction with the fear that if they become 
poor themselves in the long run no-one will financially assist them.  
A local jurisdiction that has higher private income level and that receive higher state grants 
offers a higher level of welfare benefits. As a result the local jurisdiction will end up having 
in-migration because of the attractive benefit level and the number of welfare recipients will 
increase as well. This outcome leads to the disagreement that there is a negative correlation 
between income level and the welfare benefit level in a municipality. Higher income level 
will trigger a decrease in the level of welfare benefit and the objective will be to avoid 
magnetism in the local jurisdiction. A municipality with higher income level will be forced to 
reduce benefits level and hence income distribution has an effect on the redistribution policy 
of a municipality (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006). 
But different municipalities receive different levels of financing and they all differ in their 
needs of their populations. Since local governments are accountable for providing welfare 
benefits to poor people in their jurisdictions, they are independent institutions that are 
governed by a chosen resident board of its municipality (Fiva, 2009). According to Fiva 
(2009) approximately 90% of the income that local governments receive comes from tax 
sharing with the central government and the provincial board and from the grants that are 
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provided by the central government. And the remaining 10% of its income comes from 
property tax and services of infrastructure within their respective municipalities (Fiva, 2009).  
Strategic collaborations among local governments might lead to the tax system that diverges 
significantly from a tax system based on an assessment of social costs and social benefits. 
This can lead some local governments to impose property tax in their jurisdiction whilst some 
do not levy property taxes in their jurisdictions. This means the choice of imposing property 
taxes by local governments is probably influenced by policies of neighboring local 
jurisdictions. Thus the interactions of municipalities must be significantly considered. People 
who reside in a municipality will commonly judge their own local government based on the 
neighboring municipalities. They weigh how they fulfill their preferences and rate the 
commitment of their local government in comparison to their neighbors (Fiva and Rattsø, 
2006).  
Fiva & Rattsø (2006) says that the state grant that all municipalities in Norway receive differs 
from one municipality to another. “The municipalities with a high private income level end up 
with relatively low local government revenue per capita, while private poor municipalities 
end up as relatively rich local governments. The grants, including regulated taxes and 
representing about 80% of local government revenue on average, have a positive effect on the 
welfare benefit level”(Fiva and Rattsø, 2006. p. 216).  
The level of private income a municipality has reflects the desire to impose property tax. As 
the level of private income in a municipality increases the probability of willingness to charge 
property tax that the local government of that municipality has decreases. A municipality that 
has high income level does not have property tax. For example there is an attention grabbing 
with municipalities in the Akershus and Vestfold provinces they don`t have residential 
property taxation. It`s  because most of the local governments in these provinces have high 
private income which means competition among these local governments restricts them from 
imposing property tax in their municipalities (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006). Another factor is also 
that these provinces are close to Oslo province which does not charge property tax. Therefore 
benchmark competition among municipalities in these provinces has led them not to charge 
property taxation.  
23 
 
According to Fiva & Rattsø (2006) since there is no equality in the grants that are provided by 
the state, additional costs are the burden of the local government. Welfare benefits which are 
paid to welfare recipients monthly are calculated based on the welfare norms which 
policymakers within local jurisdictions come up with as their preferred level of welfare 
benefit.  They are a vital tool which is quite worthy to use to study the welfare migration 
between jurisdictions. People in a municipality rate their own municipality against 
neighboring municipalities based on two things. First and foremost they compare the services 
that are being provided by their local government with those being offered by neighboring 
jurisdictions. Secondly they observe how their local government executes their plans in 
providing the services. Hence this might cause welfare competition which may be a negative 
factor in establishing a welfare policy which favors pooling of poor people rather than 
attracting rich people in a municipality.  
Fiva & Rattsø (2006) further says when policymakers come up with a certain level of welfare 
norm in a local jurisdiction that level of welfare norm is what is used to calculate welfare 
benefits to individuals. This is done by taking into consideration and evaluating demands of 
each and every individual depending on their different cases. Since individuals are 
heterogeneous and have different demands, a monthly welfare benefit that is paid to a single 
person who lives alone differs from what is paid to a single person living with children. And 
the time duration which individuals will be in need of the benefit differs as well. For example 
some will be in need of support for some few weeks if they are out of employment and some 
will be in need of support for a long period of time (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006). 
According to Orr (1976) if a municipality has a small number of least-skilled people who 
depend on welfare benefits, they receive higher welfare benefits than those who live in a 
municipality with a larger number of least-skilled receiving welfare benefits. He further says 
that welfare recipients will relocate from low benefit municipalities to high benefits 
municipalities in order to maximize their income. The costs attached to welfare benefits will 
increase as the inflow of poor people increases and this will reduce the welfare benefit level 
below what was being offered. 
 The effects of welfare benefits on welfare migration can be well explained by the decisions 
encountered by the policymakers in a municipality when they are faced with a challenge of 
increasing the welfare benefit level. They always compare the cost and benefit analysis in 
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their situation in trying to improve the situation of the poor in their jurisdictions. They weigh 
whether they should improve the living standards of the poor at the expense of a huge tax 
burden and huge total costs. Which means if the poor remain in their jurisdiction the rich 
people`s tax burden will increase in order to assist the poor. But however if welfare migration 
exists, the number of welfare benefit recipients increases when the welfare benefit is high. 
Since there is a positive correlation between high welfare benefits and an increase in the 
number of welfare recipients then the tax burden becomes larger when the poor relocate for 
better welfare benefits. Therefore local governments are forced not to be generous as they 
might be willing to and will end up lowering welfare benefit so as not to attract more welfare 
recipients (Brueckner, 2000).  
3.3 Evidence on strategic interactions among 
local jurisdictions 
According Fiva & Rattsø (2006) the migration model is explained by two sides. On one side 
are the policymakers and their challenges in setting a level of welfare benefit they assume is 
favorable for their local jurisdiction. On the other side are the welfare beneficiaries who have 
their own evaluation of a local jurisdiction which depends on how attractive the municipality 
is. The attractiveness of local jurisdiction is given more weight by utility maximization. 
Welfare recipients derive more utility from a local jurisdiction that offers a higher welfare 
benefit level than a local jurisdiction that offers a low level of benefits. For equilibrium to be 
reached the demand and supply sides of the welfare benefits must be equal. The demand side 
is explained by the policymakers who decide the level of welfare benefits in a municipality 
based on the number of people who are already receiving the benefits. This means that the 
level of the welfare benefit depends on the number of people. If a group of poor people in a 
municipality is becoming large then the benefit level will be lowered.  
The supply side is explained by the level of the welfare benefits in a municipality that makes 
welfare recipients respond to it. Setting up of welfare benefit levels depends on 
responsiveness of migration. If the response is quick, a small increase in welfare benefit level 
will trigger a large number of welfare recipients to migrate. The municipalities will react by 
offering low levels of benefits. But if the response is very slow, it means a large increase in 
the benefit level will trigger just a small number of welfare benefit recipients to migrate. It 
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basically means that local governments set up welfare benefits levels with the aim of 
dampening the motives of migration. But still, in the absence of welfare migration welfare 
competition will be an important factor because of strategic interactions of the local 
jurisdictions (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006).  
Strategic interactions between municipalities and the combined levels of income of a 
municipality produce a geographical pattern especially in Norway (Fiva & Rattsø; 2006). For 
example the province of Akershus which is located in the southern part of Norway has 
municipalities that do not differ that much in their welfare benefits levels. The levels are quite 
similar and they are quite low as compared to the levels offered in the province of Finnmark 
which is located in the northern part of Norway. The municipalities in the Finnmark province 
have bigger differences in their levels of welfare benefits but at the same time they have low 
private income levels. This is because in the Akershus province the welfare benefits levels are 
quite homogeneous because of short distances between municipalities and due to very low 
transportation costs between the municipalities (Fiva & Rattsø, 2006).   
In contrast, Finnmark province has levels of welfare benefits that are quite different. They 
vary a lot across the province because of the huge distances between the municipalities and 
the high transportation costs of moving from one municipality to another. The differences 
highlighted above are quite consistent with welfare competition among neighboring local 
jurisdictions but at the same time they do directly reveal demographic variation across the 
country. Because of the state grants, richer municipalities offer a higher level of welfare 
benefits and that is the reason why local governments in the Finnmark province have income 
per capita that is well above average as compared to the Akershus province which is below 
the average. It also adds up to geographical location of provinces. Provinces in the southern 
part of the country like Østfold, Akershus, Hedmark, Oppland, Buskerud have almost similar 
levels of benefits. They do not vary a lot because they are close to each other. In contrast 
provinces in the northern part of the country like Troms, Nordland and Finnmark are quite far 
from each other. As a result the transportation costs in these provinces are quite huge and 
their levels of welfare benefits vary a lot. These differences in geographical location of 
provinces portray some geographical pattern in welfare benefits in Norway. They are not tied 
to welfare competition but to strategic interactions between neighboring municipalities and 
provinces (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006). 
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 “The policy intervention that we suggest and use as an instrument in this paper is not unique 
for Sweden. Similar programs exist in other countries, and we believe that the use of such 
programs can be a fruitful way of approaching the problem encountered in models of welfare 
competition.” (Dahlberg and Edmark, 2008, p1208). The effect of refugees on welfare benefit 
levels is very strong since they increase the number of welfare beneficiaries. However since 
the number of immigrants is another factor that affects the population characteristics in 
determining the amount of grants that are offered to different local governments. It means this 
has an impact also on the welfare benefits that are offered in these local governments (Fiva, 
2009).   
Basically the levels of support for welfare beneficiaries differs greatly with the presence of 
migration than if the welfare recipients would remain in their original jurisdictions. This is 
because neighboring local jurisdictions will always observe characteristics of their 
neighboring municipalities in choosing their level of welfare benefits. With the 
decentralization of welfare benefits distribution allocated to local governments, this 
encourages welfare migration of welfare beneficiaries. And this has consequences of race to 
the bottom in choosing suitable welfare benefits levels by local governments. And as a matter 
of fact this might trigger under provision of welfare services to welfare recipients who are in 
need of the welfare services. The decentralization of welfare benefits to local governments 
might also lead to quite excessive spending by the municipalities because of the welfare 
migration as these municipalities receive state grants (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006). 
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4 Data and summarized statistics  
 Norway has a decentralized system of distributing welfare benefits, which means it is the 
responsibility of the local government to offer financial assistance to its residents who reside 
in its municipality. The welfare policy which the local governments use is founded on 
regulations set by the central government. The regulations state how to select people who are 
in need and state the guidelines for screening of people who are eligible for the welfare 
benefits. This is done through the Social Service Authority which provides the framework of 
the procedures to apply to the local government so that the local governments makes their 
decisions on how much to give to the welfare benefit recipients in their local jurisdiction 
(Fiva, 2009).  
 The population of Norway is distributed over 434 local governments over the whole country. 
These local governments have the power to determine the level of welfare benefits they offer 
in their municipality. This has led to the different levels being offered by different local 
governments. Since the funding of the local governments is highly centralized, the central 
government offers motives to the local governments when it distributes grants to local 
governments. The municipalities receive different amounts of grants distributed to them as 
block grants depending on two measurable elements (Fiva, 2009).   
According to Fiva (2009) the central government takes into consideration population 
characteristics of a municipality for example age composition. They look at how the ages of 
the population are distributed in calculating the grant for a given municipality. A local 
jurisdiction with a lot of old people who need elderly care is given more in that sector to 
establish or improve their old people`s centers. On the other hand a municipality with a lot of 
young people will need more grant in sectors like schools and kindergartens so as to be able 
to accommodate all of its young populations. The second element is tax equalization. With tax 
equalization, local governments with people being paid low amounts of income (less-skilled 
people) and paying less tax due to the nature of their jobs are reimbursed by 90 % under the 
average so as to raise their revenue.  Cases of the welfare benefit recipients will always differ 
and hence the final welfare benefit levels will be differing as well. For example a single 
person gets an amount that differs to what a single parent with two children will get. But the 
central government does not equalize grants based on the number of welfare recipients within 
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a municipality. Two municipalities might have the same number of welfare benefit recipients 
in their jurisdictions but they will receive different amounts of grants from the central 
government. This is as a result of how the local governments screen their welfare benefits. A 
very lenient municipality will end up having a lot of welfare recipients whilst some stricter 
municipalities will have fewer welfare recipients. Hence the central government does not look 
into the figures of how many people receive welfare benefits in different municipalities (Fiva, 
2009).  
But however   this system shows that the local government does not bear the whole burden of 
welfare migration because of the population characteristics mentioned above. The central 
government has a mandate to look at the characteristics of the population in different 
municipalities. They have to look at number of the unemployed people, the marital status of 
the population as well as the number of immigrants who reside in that municipality. But at the 
same time if poor people migrate to a certain municipality the local government of that local 
jurisdiction will be responsible for the extra costs incurred due to migration. The most 
important factors in a municipality that affects the number of welfare benefits recipients are 
the number of refugees, number of divorced people and the number of unemployed people. 
As the number of these people increases in a municipality the amount paid as welfare benefits 
and the total costs incurred will also increase at the same time (Fiva, 2009). 
4.1 Welfare benefit levels in Norway 
According to Fiva (2009) in 2001 the central government introduced a national guideline 
welfare benefit norm. This was as a result of huge difference in the welfare benefits that were 
offered by different local governments over the whole of Norway. The differences were quite 
huge such that the central government brought about the guideline level so that all local 
governments will set up their welfare norms based on that level.  From the figure below (fig 
5) the y-axis shows the amount that was offered in NOK and the x-axis shows the years over 
which the data was collected. Figure constructed based on the data table from Fiva (2009 
p531) paper. The difference between the highest and the lowest amounts over the years from 
1995 to 2001 was very big such that the reason for the introduction of the guideline norm was 
to reduce the gap. The standard national welfare norm was not a mandatory for the local 
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governments to implement but was a guideline in trying to reduce the huge gap between the 
welfare benefits levels of different municipalities.  
 
 
Fig. 5: Different welfare benefit norms offered from 1995 to 2001. 
When the national welfare benefit norm was introduced a number of local governments that 
set their welfare benefit norm level at that national welfare benefit norm were 119. Sixty-two 
of the 119 local governments were offering welfare benefit norm that was higher than the 
guideline benefit norm when it was implemented and 57 local governments were offering a 
welfare benefit norm level that was below the guideline welfare norm (Fiva, 2009). The 
remaining 220 local governments were offering levels of welfare norm above and 91 were 
offering levels below the national welfare benefit norm (Fiva, 2009). Just a year before the 
introduction of the national welfare benefit norm in 2000 there was no single local 
government which was offering the same level as the national welfare benefit norm. Two 
hundred and sixty-five local governments of the total number were offering higher levels than 
the national guideline welfare benefit norm and 165 were offering levels below. The 
observations were made from 430 local governments as illustrated on the table below, the 
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table was taken from Fiva (2009, p.531). The table below shows the highest and the lowest 
politically welfare benefit norms that were observed for a single person without children 
across the 430 municipalities in Norway (Fiva 2009). 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on welfare benefits levels of different municipalities 
From the table above (table 1) it shows that there was a huge difference between the lowest 
and the highest level of the welfare benefit that was offered to a single person by different 
local governments. The average welfare benefit norm that was received by a single person 
was 4119 NOK whilst the highest was 7291 NOK and the lowest was 2760 NOK which 
shows a great difference (Fiva, 2009). This great difference is not explained by 
accommodation costs. Since people live in different houses, the accommodation expenses are 
not taken into account when policymakers decide on the level of welfare benefit norm to 
enforce. And it cannot be explained by the differences in zones where people reside as well. 
Locations such as the outskirts of the cities and the central part of the city do not matter, 
because even if people reside in the same municipality they will always pay different amounts 
of accommodation expenses (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006). 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Mean 3620 3710 3808 3969 4044 4119 4119
Minimum 1900 1900 2102 2258 2484 2600 2760
Median 3660 3697 3800 3935 4005 4068 3950
Maximum 5280 5520 5722 6441 5964 6969 7291
National instructive  norm in NOK 3880
Number of local governments above the instructive norm 265 220
Number of local governments at the instructive norm 0 119
Number of local governments below the instructive norm 165 91
Observations 430 430 430 430 430 430 430
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After the introduction of the national guideline welfare norm in 2001, the reactions of the 
local governments from 2002 and onwards was of interest to investigate. The investigation 
was vital to see if many local governments ended up on the national guideline welfare norm 
level and what effects does that has on the migration of poor people depending on the welfare 
benefits. And it is also important to examine whether the huge gap between the highest and 
the lowest welfare benefit norms was drastically reduced. Large differences between welfare 
benefit norms has a huge effect on mobility of welfare recipients across jurisdictions since 
this is a critical component then the outcome is important.  
4.1 Results 
The table below (table 2) was constructed based on the data of welfare benefits norms from 
Sentral Statistics Bureau (SSB) that different municipalities in Norway paid to a single person 
household per month from 2002 up to 2008, the levels of the welfare benefits varied across 
the country.  
 
       Table 2: Descriptive statistics on welfare benefits levels of different municipalities.  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Mean 4207 4161 4168 4259 4327 4585 4739
Minimum 1000 400 3000 2140 3120 3000 3500
Median 3571 3571 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720
Maximum 6140 8600 5996 8600 9434 10002 10002
National guideline 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720
No of local governments 
above the guideline norm 186 167 126 136 107 129 72
No of local governments 
at the guideline norm 141 174 175 202 224 302 295
No of local governments
below the guideline norm 105 92 129 95 97 70 60
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433
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From the table above the number of local governments who paid welfare benefit norms which 
were above the national guideline welfare norm was reduced significantly along the way from 
2002 up to 2008. There were 186 local governments that offered welfare benefits levels above 
the national guideline norm in 2002 and only 72 local governments in 2008. The number of 
local governments which were paying levels below the national instructive norm also 
decreased from 105 in 2002 to 60 in 2008. Notably the number of local governments who 
chose to offer the level of welfare benefits just equal to the national guideline norm increased 
very significantly with time from 141 in 2002 to 295 in 2008. This shows that there was more 
than 100% increase in the number of the local governments who chose to implement the 
national guideline norm. This is illustrated on the figure below (fig 6).  
 
Fig. 6: Municipalities that offered levels above, below and exactly equal to the guideline 
From the figure above it shows that most of the local governments converged to the national 
guideline norm. Though it was not mandatory for the local government to follow the national 
guideline norm that was suggested by the central government most of the local governments 
chose to do so. The number of local governments who offered amount exactly equal to the 
national guideline rose up sharply as highlighted by the figure above. Whilst the number of 
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local governments offering amounts below and above the guideline fell sharply which shows 
that most of the municipalities took into consideration the national guideline when they were 
setting their levels of welfare benefits.   
 The national guideline norm has slightly increased over the period from 4000 NOK in 2002 
to 4720NOK in 2008 which shows that the change was small and it can be suggested that the 
central government prefer a stable level of the welfare benefits. The mean amount didn`t 
differ a lot from the national guideline norm from 2002 to 2008. It is very close to the 
guideline norm that shows that most of the local governments were offering welfare benefits 
levels close the guideline norm though they may be below or just above the national chosen 
welfare level as shown on the figure below (fig 7). 
 
Fig. 7: Levels of benefits offered by municipalities across Norway from 2002 to 2008 
4.2 Analysis of the data 
Based on the data used in this paper local governments in the provinces of Akershus, Østfold, 
Vestfold, Telemark, and Buskerud are generally the ones which mostly lie on the national 
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guideline welfare norm. There is a trend shown for municipalities like Halden, Moss, Ås, 
Vestby, Nes, Skien, and Porsgrunn, just to mention a few. These municipalities were paying 
the levels of welfare benefits which were the same as the national guideline welfare norm. 
This means that they chose to implement the national guideline welfare benefit norm. This 
trend has supported the phenomena that there is significant and strategic interactions between 
neighboring local jurisdictions in setting their levels of welfare benefits in their 
municipalities. A lot of municipalities in the southern part of the country preferred to offer 
similar levels of the welfare benefits. These provinces which are so close to each other, avoid 
attracting welfare recipients in their local jurisdiction by offering similar levels of welfare 
benefits to all welfare recipients in their municipalities.  
This is supported by Brueckner (2000) he argues that when local governments choose their 
level of welfare benefits they consider what their neighboring jurisdictions are offering in 
order to set lower levels than them. By doing so, they strategically interact with their 
neighbors. Such kind of behavior by local governments leads to the same outcome of trying to 
avoid clustering of welfare recipients within their municipalities. Hence if a local jurisdiction 
is concerned about welfare migration, then what its neighboring jurisdictions are offering is of 
great importance in affecting its own welfare benefit choice. As a result “evidence of strategic 
interaction among states thus provides indirect evidence that welfare migration affects policy 
decisions, suggesting that the benefit choices may involve a race to the bottom” (Brueckner, 
2000 p. 508).  
The municipality of Oslo was offering 4300 NOK in 2002 and increased it by 100% in 2003 
to 8600 NOK and then decreased the amount to 4350 NOK in 2004 which was just close to 
the guideline norm which was 4140 NOK in that year. Then afterwards Oslo just offered an 
amount which was very close to the guideline norm. The amount from 2004 which Oslo local 
jurisdiction was paying was close to what its surrounding neighboring jurisdictions was 
offering as well. This shows that after the welfare reform they did not chose to offer the 
suggested level of welfare benefit. But just 2 years later they chose to offer a level close to 
what its neighbors were offering implying strategic interactions with neighboring 
municipalities and a race to the bottom in setting welfare benefit level. This was supported by 
Orr (1976) and Dahlberg & Edmark (2008).  
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According to Brown & Oates`s (1987) model which was adopted from Orr (1976) and which 
is similar to Dahlberg and Edmark`s (2008) model, the levels of welfare benefits is negatively 
correlated with the elasticity of mobility of welfare beneficiaries function. This can be 
explained as, the greater the prospect of mobility of welfare recipients in response to a change 
in the level of support to the poor, the lower will be the local jurisdiction`s level of welfare 
benefits to welfare beneficiaries (Orr, 1976). This can be explained by the diagram below (fig. 
8). All the poor people in the jurisdiction are paid the same amount of income. And the 
income receive comes from the transfers which are funded by the non poor in their 
jurisdiction. In addition, the number of the rich people in the jurisdiction is greater than that of 
poor people in that jurisdiction. Therefore more can be deduced from the properties of such 
equilibrium because of migration and the reaction of the non-poor in response to mobility of 
the poor people. As illustrated on the diagram below: 
 
Fig. 8: Relationship between number of poor residents and transfer payments. 
D
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 D represents the willingness to pay for welfare benefits levels made by the non poor in a 
jurisdiction to the poor people.  M represents the mobility curve of the welfare recipients, its 
upward sloping indicating that the number of poor people in a jurisdiction increases with an 
increase in level of welfare benefit. The equilibrium point for the level of welfare benefit to be 
offered and the number of welfare recipients would be reached when the mobility curve (M) 
intersects with the transfer payment curve (D), which is originally at point A as indicated on 
the diagram above.  If more welfare recipients are attracted to the jurisdiction because of the 
level of welfare benefit level being offered    which is high then mobility curve  
 becomes 
steeper which reflects the huge response of welfare benefit recipients to the level of welfare 
benefits.  The equilibrium position will change because the level of welfare benefit will 
decrease; this is mainly because the demand function (level of welfare benefit) is influenced 
by the response of the mobility curve. As the   curve becomes steeper and become   which 
shows a great sensitivity of the poor people to the level of welfare benefits, the demand curve 
will shift downwards reflecting the decrease in willingness to pay by the non-poor people in a 
jurisdiction. Hence the new equilibrium will be reached at point B which concludes a fall in 
assistance to the poor triggered by the elasticity of the welfare migration (Brown and Oates, 
1987).  
Local governments that offer higher welfare benefits have positive correlation between the 
level of welfare benefit they offer which is high and the amount of welfare benefit recipients 
which will be higher. This is because variables that affect an escalation in welfare generosity 
have the same effects also on welfare benefits levels and the proportion of welfare recipients 
which will be positive in both scenarios. But with an increase in migration they will not afford 
to be continuously generous. As a result, local governments with higher welfare benefit levels 
will create a converse relation. The welfare benefits levels and the share of the welfare 
recipients will be negatively correlated as the local governments will respond by lowering the 
level of benefits they offer (Wheaton, 1998). 
There is also a trend that shows that municipalities which basically each year offer high or 
maximum amounts across the country were Vadsø, Hattfjelldal, and Karasjok among the 
others. These municipalities are situated in the northern part of the country. As a result, it 
shows that there is a geographical pattern shown by the different levels of welfare benefits 
paid by different municipalities. Municipalities in the southern part converged to the national 
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guideline welfare norm and municipalities in the northern part paid higher levels above the 
national guideline welfare norm. This supports the idea of welfare competition among 
jurisdictions close to each other and demographic variation in the municipalities across the 
country. This is argued for by Brueckner (2000) and Fiva & Rattsø (2006). Brueckner (2000) 
argues that strategic interactions between neighboring municipalities therefore provide 
indirect evidence of whether welfare migration affects welfare benefit choices. The absence of 
interactions of local governments reflects that welfare migration is not a factor. Evidence of 
strategic interactions is not a very concrete basis for welfare migration. It’s rather the fact that 
neighboring local governments are concerned over the welfare benefits that other jurisdictions 
are offering in order to determine its own benefit level. That on its own suggests that the 
response of local governments in such a way will end up being a race to the bottom in setting 
their levels of welfare benefits (Brueckner, 2000). With strategic interaction, when a 
municipality wants to set its welfare benefit level, it first observes the welfare benefits of 
other municipalities. After that it then makes its decision. This is welfare competition because 
the decision of how to reach at the level that they chose was not done in isolation but was 
based on other municipalities (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006).  
The great differences among the levels of welfare benefits that municipalities offered before 
the introduction of the national welfare benefit norm were caused by each local government 
was free to choose any welfare benefit level they intended to offer. And this might have led to 
some local governments being more generous than the others hence offering higher welfare 
benefits (Dahlberg & Edmark, 2008). This trend was the same for Norway before the 
introduction of the welfare reform. This was supported by Meyer (2000) and Dahlberg and 
Edmark (2008) when they carried out their investigations. Dahlberg & Edmark (2008) 
mentioned that in Sweden some local governments who paid minimum levels, their welfare 
benefits levels were below what were suggested by The National Board of Health and 
Welfare. And this great variation triggered the introduction of a mandatory minimum level of 
welfare benefits level in Sweden in 1998. This case was similar to the one in the U.S when 13 
states were very strict in offering welfare benefits and offered very low levels of welfare 
benefits. And they imposed time limits for new people who were welfare benefits recipients 
migrated to their states, so as not to attract more welfare recipients in their states but to 
maintain the number they already offer financial assistance to. In trying to do so they ended 
up giving welfare benefits which were not enough for the poor people to survive a decent or 
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normal life such that it was viewed as unconstitutional and was banned (Meyer, 2000). 
Therefore these situations have lead to the welfare reforms in different countries. 
Meanwhile the differences in local governments welfare demands does not have statistically 
major impacts on welfare benefit levels alone. It has an impact on the amount of welfare 
recipients in a municipality as well. There is therefore significant evidence of migration based 
on welfare elasticity in response to welfare benefit levels. Whilst differences in local 
governments’ welfare supply does not have statistically major impacts on the fraction of the 
welfare recipient share alone but also on the welfare benefit levels as well. Therefore the 
demand of the level of welfare payments does also have negative elasticity in comparison to 
the amount of the welfare benefits recipients in a municipality (Wheaton, 1998).  
The investigated results presented in this paper greatly suggest the postulated concern over a 
race to the bottom scenario can be well justified. Positive strategic interactions shows that 
benefit levels in neighboring local jurisdictions affect a given local government`s welfare 
benefit level`s choice. Thus the most important source of such interactions of municipalities is 
the welfare migration. Welfare migration influences the policymakers of different local 
governments to observe the levels of welfare benefits being offered by its surrounding local 
neighbors. This fact therefore verifies the idea that there is consistency of a race to the bottom 
in setting welfare benefit levels by local governments (Brueckner, 2000). 
Section 4 of this paper has highlighted Dahlberg & Edmark (2008) `s model that predicted a 
race to the bottom as municipalities responded to the welfare migration by not being generous 
in setting welfare benefits levels. This model is supported by a similar model in Brueckner`s 
paper (2000) that was adopted from Brown and Oates (1987) and Wildasin (1991). In these 
models it shows that the policymakers and the rich people they are really interested in the 
total costs that is they quickly respond to cost effects of more inequality in their local 
jurisdictions whilst welfare recipients are mainly concerned about income effects and they 
therefore respond quickly to changes in income levels (Fiva and Rattsø, 2006).The models 
above predict a race to the bottom outcome as the states decreases the levels of welfare 
benefits as a reaction to welfare migration.  
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5 Econometric model 
5.1 What I could have done if I had the net 
migration data. 
Economic models stated above in the second chapter assumes that welfare benefit recipients 
are income maximizes hence their decisions to migrate from one municipality to another are 
greatly influenced by higher welfare benefits being offered in other municipalities. So 
migration is triggered by people who want to maximize their income and utility, hence they 
calculate the cost and benefit analysis and relocate to a municipality that gives them 
maximum income and utility (Fiva, 2009). Borjas`s (1999) idea that some inborn citizens are 
located in their most preferred states and some will migrate to the desired states sounds 
plausible. Because given that and ceteris paribas, whenever a state offers a higher welfare 
benefit compared to other states, migration will be observed and the number of welfare 
benefit recipients in that state will increase hence concluding the effect of an increase in 
welfare benefit level. Conforming to the model by Borjas (1999) that states that offer higher 
welfare benefits will always attract a population that could be have migrated somewhere else 
other than where they have been attracted to or these people could have stayed in their inborn 
state and never thought of welfare migration as a possibility. 
So in this paper I could have tested if there was a positive correlation between the welfare 
benefits norm levels being offered by different local governments and the net migration of 
people who are welfare benefit recipients. This is because people relocate from one 
jurisdiction to another for various reasons like availability of educational facilities and better 
employment opportunities other than higher levels of welfare benefits.  Paying great attention 
on welfare benefits levels as the only factor that affects migration will not give correct results. 
So the idea was to compare the migration of welfare benefit recipients to another group of 
people who do not receive welfare benefits. For example people migrate from northern part of 
Norway to the southern part especially because of better employment opportunities and 
availability of educational facilities in the southern part of the country. So my intention was to 
do regressions of these two groups of people, namely those who are welfare recipients and 
non-welfare recipients to see how they responded to higher welfare benefits levels by 
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comparing results of the two models, with the net migration flows (difference between the 
inflow and the outflow of people in a certain local jurisdiction) and the welfare benefit norm 
levels as the variables of interest. The two model equations will be different in that the other 
one will omit the welfare benefit level variable and its coefficient whilst the other one will 
include it so as to note the difference between the effects of welfare benefit level on 
migration. I could have based my study on a model by Fiva (2009). The model is stated as: 
                                        
  =   
 +   +     +   
  
    
 is the net migration of welfare benefit recipients,   being the coefficient  that shows the 
significance of welfare  benefit migration,     shows the welfare benefit level of local 
government    at time   ,     shows the unobserved characteristics that could be assumed to 
affect both groups in a similar way,   
  reflects time invariant characteristics that affects 
migration of households of type    and    
  being the error term (Fiva, 2009). 
And the other comparing equation was     
  =  
 +   +   
   the two equations have similar 
terms except in the second equation there is   , instead of   . The   on the terms in the second 
equation which represents the non-recipients as compared to the   for the welfare recipients in 
the first equation. Comparing the outcomes of the two models the difference will be the       
which explains the welfare benefit that is offered in local government    , and its coefficient   
will be of quite great importance to see the extend of the significance of welfare benefit level 
on net migration (Fiva, 2009).  The model captures the right group of people who would have 
migrated because of the welfare benefits as their main reason leaving the other group who 
could have migrated because of other reasons. 
But because of limitation of net migration data, I chose to focus on the reactions of local 
governments to the introduction of the instructive welfare norm. And investigated if 
municipalities implemented the national guideline norm, which is a result of a race to the 
bottom outcome as a strategy not to attract many welfare benefit recipients.   
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6 Conclusion 
Many economists have argued that welfare migration has a huge impact that leads to a race to 
the bottom outcome by local jurisdictions in setting their preferred levels of welfare benefits. 
For local jurisdictions to avoid being welfare magnets they end up choosing levels of welfare 
benefits that are below the levels that are appreciated by the society. The goal of this thesis 
has been to show that after the welfare reform was introduced in 2001 in Norway, many local 
jurisdictions converged to the national guideline level of benefits which justifies the 
substantiation in approval of the race to the bottom outcome.  
This conclusion was strengthened by the levels of welfare benefits that local jurisdictions in 
Norway paid in their respective jurisdictions from 2002 to 2008, bringing significant evidence 
of strategic interactions which shows that benefit levels in neighboring jurisdictions affects a 
given local jurisdiction`s benefit choice. The utmost credible foundation of such strategic 
interaction is a great concern about welfare migration that policymakers are busy observing 
levels of welfare benefits their neighboring jurisdictions are offering in setting up their own 
preferred level of benefits. This behavior portrayed by neighboring local jurisdictions is quite 
fascinating in that local jurisdictions are certainly playing a welfare game which is indeed 
driven by the worry of welfare migration and as a result will lead to the emerging of the race 
to the bottom outcome in setting levels of welfare benefits in different local jurisdictions. 
The decentralized governments, the local and regional governments were assumed to provide 
and allocate the public goods in different local jurisdictions in accordance with the local 
preferences of the municipalities. It was mainly to take advantage of local knowledge the 
local jurisdictions have of the people who reside in their municipalities therefore they could 
deliver the required levels in their local jurisdictions.  But this decentralization of welfare 
benefits to local governments might have lead to quite excessive spending by the 
municipalities. It has also encouraged the creation of welfare migration and has resulted in 
under provision and even the race to the bottom scenario.  
In a model with welfare migration, a significant result will be convergence of most local 
jurisdictions’ on the level of welfare benefits to a mutual national level of welfare benefit set 
by the authorities. The numbers of welfare recipients’ across the country differs with how 
generous the local jurisdictions have been before the welfare reform took place. Before the 
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welfare reform was introduced, many of the municipalities were offering welfare benefits 
levels which were above or below the national guideline. After 2002, most of the local 
governments converged to the national guideline norm implying quite significant result of a 
model with welfare migration. A lot of municipalities in the southern part of the country 
preferred to offer similar levels of welfare benefits. This trend shows there is a significant 
strategic interaction between neighboring local jurisdictions in setting levels of welfare 
benefits. It further demonstrates the existence of a race to the bottom in setting welfare 
benefits levels triggered by welfare migration and strategic interactions by local jurisdictions. 
Given the cases presented in this paper, policymakers in different countries believe that 
welfare migration occurs in most countries. They try to disentangle the problem by offering 
low levels of welfare benefits in an attempt to reduce the number of welfare recipients in their 
local jurisdictions.  
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Appendix: Welfare benefit norms data from 
2002 -2008 for municipalities in Norway 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Halden 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 
Moss 3792 4000 4000 4136 4270 4600 4720 
Sarpsborg 3500 3500 4000 4000 4200 4500 4720 
Fredrikstad 3757 3940 3950 3950 4140 4600 4720 
Hvaler 3600 3600 3600 3600 4270 4600 4720 
Aremark 4254 4254 4254 4254 4254 4270 4720 
Marker 4254 4254 4254 4254 4270 4600 5105 
Rømskog 4244 4244 4140 4140 4140 4600 5105 
Trøgstad 4254 4254 4254 4254 4270 4600 4720 
Spydeberg 4254 4254 4254 4254 4270 4600 4720 
Askim 4254 4254 4254 4254 4270 4600 4720 
Eidsberg 3880 3880 4000 4000 4270 4270 4720 
Skiptvet 4254 4254 4254 4254 4254 4600 4720 
Rakkestad 4254 4254 4254 4140 4140 4600 4600 
Råde 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Rygge 3250 3250 4040 4040 4170 4170 4720 
Våler (Østf.) 3484 3719 3719 3719 4270 4600 4720 
Hobøl 3800 3800 3800 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Vestby 4160 4160 4160 4160 4160 4160 4162 
Ski 4615 4615 4615 4615 4420 4640 4640 
Ås 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4270 4720 
Frogn 4050 4050 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Nesodden 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4720 5105 
Oppegård 4000 4000 4140 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Bærum 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Asker 4605 4000 4140 4140 4270 4720 5105 
Aurskog-Høland 4210 4210 4210 4210 4210 4210 4720 
Sørum 3247 3247 3247 3247 3247 4600 4600 
Fet 3575 3575 3575 3575 4600 4600 4720 
Rælingen 3500 3500 3500 3843 3843 3843 4720 
Enebakk 4100 4200 4140 2140 4270 4600 4720 
Lørenskog 4673 4200 4200 4200 4200 4600 4720 
Skedsmo 4335 3902 3902 3902 3902 3902 3902 
Nittedal 4442 4000 4140 4140 : 4600 4720 
Gjerdrum 4200 4000 4200 4200 4200 4600 4600 
Ullensaker 3880 4000 4000 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Nes (Ak.) 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4720 
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Eidsvoll 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4270 4270 
Nannestad 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Hurdal 4673 4673 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Oslo kommune 4300 8600 4350 4450 4520 4817 5135 
Kongsvinger 4020 4020 4020 4140 4270 4270 4270 
Hamar 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Ringsaker 4535 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Løten 3880 3880 3880 3880 4270 4600 4720 
Stange 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4720 
Nord-Odal 4250 4250 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Sør-Odal 3600 3800 3800 4140 4270 4270 4270 
Eidskog 6071 4000 4000 4140 4140 4140 4347 
Grue 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4270 4270 
Åsnes 4627 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Våler (Hedm.) 4210 4210 4210 4210 4210 4210 4720 
Elverum 3680 3680 3680 3680 3680 3864 4720 
Trysil 4100 4100 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Åmot 6071 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Stor-Elvdal 4335 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Rendalen 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Engerdal 3880 3880 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Tolga 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 5105 
Tynset 4335 4335 4335 4335 4335 4600 4720 
Alvdal 3880 3880 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Folldal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Os (Hedm.) 4000 4000 4140 5130 4270 4600 4720 
Lillehammer 4478 4541 4600 4669 4669 4739 4834 
Gjøvik 3880 4000 4000 4000 4270 4600 4720 
Dovre 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4720 
Lesja 4500 4500 4500 4500 4600 4600 4720 
Skjåk 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 
Lom 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4600 5105 
Vågå 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4600 5105 
Nord-Fron 4000 4000 4000 4000 4270 4600 5105 
Sel 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4720 
Sør-Fron 4000 4000 4140 4270 4600 4600 4720 
Ringebu 4610 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Øyer 4510 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4720 
Gausdal 4610 4610 4610 4140 4350 4350 4861 
Østre Toten 3880 3880 4140 4140 4600 4600 5105 
Vestre Toten 4000 4000 4140 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Jevnaker 3950 3950 4150 4140 4270 4720 4720 
Lunner 5084 5084 5084 4140 4270 4600 4720 
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Gran 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4720 
Søndre Land 4000 4000 4140 4140 4600 4600 4760 
Nordre Land 4000 4000 4000 4000 4270 4600 4720 
Sør-Aurdal 4050 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Etnedal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 5105 
Nord-Aurdal 4050 4050 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Vestre Slidre 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Øystre Slidre 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Vang 4000 4130 4130 4200 4600 4720 4720 
Drammen 3880 3880 3880 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Kongsberg 3668 4035 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Ringerike 4000 4000 4140 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Hole 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 
Flå 4000 4000 4000 3880 4270 4600 4720 
Nes (Busk.) 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Gol 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Hemsedal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Ål 3800 3800 3800 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Hol 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Sigdal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Krødsherad 3880 3880 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Modum 3880 3880 3880 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Øvre Eiker 4000 3800 3800 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Nedre Eiker 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 4600 4720 
Lier 3880 3880 3880 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Røyken 4000 4000 4140 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Hurum 3588 3588 3588 4140 4270 4270 4540 
Flesberg 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Rollag 4280 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Nore og Uvdal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Horten 3880 3880 3880 4140 4140 4270 5105 
Holmestrand 3880 3880 3880 3880 4270 4600 4720 
Tønsberg 4335 4335 4335 4335 4340 4600 4720 
Sandefjord 4120 4120 4270 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Larvik 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Svelvik 3500 3500 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Sande (Vestf.) 4046 4000 4140 4270 4270 4600 5105 
Hof 3880 4000 4000 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Re (f.o.m. 2002) 3880 3880 4000 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Ramnes (t.o.m. 2001) : : : : : : : 
Andebu 4291 4291 4291 4291 4291 4291 4291 
Stokke 5061 4000 4000 4000 4140 4270 4720 
Nøtterøy 4772 4772 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
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Tjøme 4000 3800 3800 3800 3800 3990 3990 
Lardal 5061 5309 4140 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Porsgrunn 3789 3789 3834 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Skien 1200 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Notodden 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4270 4720 
Siljan 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Bamble 3080 3080 4140 4140 4600 4600 4600 
Kragerø 3880 3880 3880 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Drangedal 4000 4000 4000 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Nome 3800 3880 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Bø (Telem.) 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Sauherad 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Tinn 4000 4000 4000 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Hjartdal 3983 3880 3880 3880 3880 4600 4720 
Seljord 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Kviteseid 3707 4100 4100 4100 4270 4600 4720 
Nissedal 4160 4160 4160 4160 4160 4600 4720 
Fyresdal 4135 4135 4135 4135 4135 4600 4720 
Tokke 4040 4040 4040 4040 4040 4600 4720 
Vinje 4040 4040 4040 4040 4600 4600 4720 
Risør 3380 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Grimstad 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Arendal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Gjerstad 3880 4000 4000 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Vegårshei 3880 3880 3880 4140 4140 4140 4600 
Tvedestrand 3880 3880 4000 4000 4000 4270 4270 
Froland 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Lillesand 4000 4140 4140 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Birkenes 4870 4888 5055 5055 4270 4600 4720 
Åmli 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Iveland 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Evje og Hornnes 4000 4000 4140 4140 4600 4600 4720 
Bygland 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Valle 4000 4000 4140 4270 4270 4600 5105 
Bykle 4000 4000 4140 4140 4600 4600 5105 
Kristiansand 4000 4000 4000 6660 4270 4270 4600 
Mandal 3600 3600 3600 3600 4270 4600 4720 
Farsund 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Flekkefjord 4000 4000 3800 3800 3800 4270 4270 
Vennesla 3350 3350 3350 3350 3350 4270 5100 
Songdalen 3568 4068 4068 4068 4140 4600 4720 
Søgne 3565 3565 3565 4140 4270 4720 4720 
Marnardal 3880 3880 3880 4000 4140 4600 4720 
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Åseral 3880 4000 4140 4140 4270 4720 4720 
Audnedal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4720 5105 
Lindesnes 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 
Lyngdal 3880 4000 4140 4140 4260 4600 4720 
Hægebostad 4912 4912 4140 4200 4270 4700 4720 
Kvinesdal 3880 3880 4000 4000 4270 4600 4720 
Sirdal 4000 4000 4000 4140 4270 4600 5105 
Eigersund 5262 4631 4631 4631 4631 4600 4720 
Sandnes 4200 4200 4200 4200 4270 4600 4720 
Stavanger 4186 4186 4186 4186 4270 4600 4720 
Haugesund 3740 3740 3740 3740 : 4600 4720 
Sokndal 4335 4335 4335 4335 4335 4600 4720 
Lund 4768 4768 4768 4768 4768 4768 4768 
Bjerkreim 4768 4768 4768 4768 4270 4600 4720 
Hå 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Klepp 5044 4790 4790 4790 4790 4600 4720 
Time 4790 4790 4790 4790 4790 4720 4720 
Gjesdal 4790 4790 4790 4790 4790 4600 4720 
Sola 4000 4000 4140 21140 4270 4600 4720 
Randaberg 4000 4000 4140 4140 4600 4600 5105 
Forsand 5044 5044 5044 5044 5044 5044 5044 
Strand 4989 4989 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Hjelmeland 4850 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 
Suldal 4420 4970 4970 4970 4970 4970 5000 
Sauda 4000 4000 4000 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Finnøy 5667 5948 : 4140 4270 4600 5105 
Rennesøy 4374 4374 4374 4374 4374 4600 4720 
Kvitsøy : : : 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Bokn 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Tysvær 3880 3880 3880 3880 4270 4600 4720 
Karmøy 4161 4286 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Utsira 4036 4286 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Vindafjord (t.o.m. 
2005) 5507 5781 5996 6171 : : : 
Ølen (t.o.m. 2005) 4000 4000 4140 4140 : : : 
Vindafjord : : : : 4270 4600 5105 
Bergen 4225 4225 4460 4679 4679 4847 5149 
Etne 4000 4000 4140 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Ølen (t.o.m. 2001) : : : : : : : 
Sveio 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Bømlo 5417 5417 5878 4340 4470 4800 4920 
Stord 4070 4070 4435 4435 4435 4600 4720 
Fitjar 4305 4305 4305 4305 4140 4600 4720 
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Tysnes 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Kvinnherad 4400 4400 4400 4400 4400 4600 5105 
Jondal 4335 4335 4335 4335 4270 4600 4720 
Odda 3996 4115 4115 4115 4115 4320 4320 
Ullensvang 4300 4300 4430 4430 4430 4430 4720 
Eidfjord 4786 4786 4786 4786 4786 4600 4720 
Ulvik 4500 4500 4500 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Granvin 4860 4000 4140 4140 4140 4700 4700 
Voss 4335 4335 4335 4335 4335 4500 4500 
Kvam 4624 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Fusa 3800 3800 3800 3800 4270 4600 4720 
Samnanger 4150 4150 4150 4150 4270 4600 4720 
Os (Hord.) 3571 3571 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Austevoll : 4000 4140 4140 : 4600 4720 
Sund 3880 3880 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Fjell 3760 3950 3950 4068 4210 4370 4600 
Askøy 3880 3930 4000 4140 4140 4270 4270 
Vaksdal 4210 4210 4210 4210 4400 4720 4720 
Modalen 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Osterøy 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4600 
Meland 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Øygarden 4280 5136 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Radøy 5262 3880 3880 3880 3880 4074 4720 
Lindås 4067 4067 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Austrheim 4177 4177 4177 4140 4140 4600 5105 
Fedje 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Masfjorden 5262 5262 5262 5262 5262 5262 5262 
Flora 3880 3880 4140 4140 4270 4270 4720 
Gulen 4416 4416 4416 4416 4416 4600 4720 
Solund 3170 3170 3170 3170 3170 3170 4720 
Hyllestad 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Høyanger 4000 4000 4000 4000 4200 4600 4720 
Vik 5108 4000 4000 4140 4270 4600 4600 
Balestrand 4692 4692 4692 4692 4692 4692 4720 
Leikanger 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5125 
Sogndal 5800 4694 4694 4694 4850 4850 4850 
Aurland 3880 4330 4330 4330 4270 4600 4720 
Lærdal 5085 5085 5085 5085 5085 5085 5085 
Årdal 5250 5250 5250 4695 5246 5246 5465 
Luster 5800 5800 4800 4800 4800 4800 4800 
Askvoll 4395 4395 4395 4395 4395 4395 : 
Fjaler 4150 4150 4150 4150 4250 4800 4800 
Gaular 4561 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
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Jølster 4561 4561 4561 4561 4561 4600 3923 
Førde 4000 4000 4140 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Naustdal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 5105 
Bremanger 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 5105 
Vågsøy 4000 4000 4000 4140 4270 4500 4720 
Selje 4605 4605 4605 4605 4605 4605 4605 
Eid 4290 4472 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Hornindal 4600 4600 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Gloppen 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Stryn 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4600 4720 
Molde 3672 3672 3672 3672 3672 4600 4720 
Kristiansund  (t.o.m. 
2007) 3672 3672 3672 3672 3672 4720 : 
Ålesund 3798 3798 3798 3798 3798 4600 4720 
Kristiansund : : : : : : 4720 
Vanylven 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Sande (M. og R.) 4000 4000 4000 4000 4270 4720 5105 
Herøy (M. og R.) 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Ulstein 3312 3312 3312 3312 4270 4270 4720 
Hareid 4000 4000 4140 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Volda 4150 4150 4150 4150 4270 4270 4270 
Ørsta 4692 4150 4150 4150 4270 4600 4720 
Ørskog 4250 4250 4250 4250 4250 4250 4250 
Norddal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Stranda 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4720 4720 
Stordal 4692 4692 4692 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Sykkylven 4000 4000 4140 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Skodje 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 4720 
Sula 4048 4249 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Giske 5085 5085 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Haram 4000 4140 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Vestnes 4624 4624 4624 4624 4270 4600 4720 
Rauma 4000 400 4140 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Nesset 4000 4000 4000 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Midsund 4047 4248 4392 4392 4700 4700 4700 
Sandøy 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Aukra 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Fræna 2760 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Eide 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348 
Averøy 3462 3462 4140 4140 4770 4600 4720 
Frei (t.o.m. 2007) 5262 5523 5523 5710 5710 5710 : 
Gjemnes 4048 4248 4392 4533 4699 4720 5105 
Tingvoll 4920 4140 4140 4140 4600 4600 4720 
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Sunndal 4920 5043 5043 5043 5043 5158 5158 
Surnadal 4000 4000 4000 4000 4100 4600 5105 
Rindal 3696 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Aure (t.o.m. 2005) 4000 4000 4000 4140 : : : 
Halsa 4000 4000 4140 4140 4600 4600 4720 
Tustna (t.o.m. 2005) 4000 4000 4140 4140 : : : 
Smøla 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Aure : : : : 4270 4600 4720 
Trondheim 3740 3740 3900 4000 4000 4600 4720 
Hemne 4989 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Snillfjord 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Hitra 3880 3880 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Frøya 4510 4000 4140 4270 4270 4600 4600 
Ørland 4290 4290 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Agdenes 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Rissa 3990 3990 3990 4140 4140 4600 4720 
Bjugn 4510 4510 4510 4510 4510 4600 4600 
Åfjord 5085 3990 3990 3990 3990 4080 4720 
Roan 4510 4510 4510 4510 4510 4600 4720 
Osen 4510 4510 4510 4510 4510 4600 4956 
Oppdal 4295 4295 4295 4295 4295 4600 4720 
Rennebu 5085 5085 5085 5085 5085 5085 5085 
Meldal 3961 3961 3961 3961 4270 4600 4720 
Orkdal 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 4600 4720 
Røros 4730 4125 4125 4125 4125 4125 4600 
Holtålen 4730 4920 4920 4920 4920 4920 4920 
Midtre Gauldal 4000 4333 4333 4333 4333 4600 4720 
Melhus 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4200 4450 
Skaun 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 5105 
Klæbu 3840 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Malvik 5050 5050 4800 4800 4800 4600 4720 
Selbu 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Tydal 4000 4000 4140 4140 4420 4720 4720 
Steinkjer 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 4075 4075 
Namsos 1000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4800 
Meråker 4045 4045 4045 4045 4270 4600 4720 
Stjørdal 4800 4800 4800 3200 4800 4800 4800 
Frosta 3906 3906 3906 4140 4140 4600 4600 
Leksvik 3780 3780 3780 3780 4270 4270 4270 
Levanger 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4600 
Verdal 3880 3000 3000 3000 3880 3880 3880 
Mosvik  (t.o.m. 2011) 4290 2310 3780 3780 4270 4270 4270 
Verran 3700 3700 3700 3700 3700 3700 3700 
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Namdalseid 4771 4771 4771 4771 4771 4600 4990 
Inderøy (t.o.m. 2011) 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Snåase Snåsa 4000 4140 : 4140 4600 4700 4720 
Lierne 4912 4912 4500 4500 4500 4600 4720 
Røyrvik 4574 4810 4970 5130 5130 5130 5105 
Namsskogan 5869 4000 4000 4000 4000 3000 4720 
Grong 4650 4650 4100 4100 3780 3780 3780 
Høylandet 5869 5000 5000 5000 4270 4600 4720 
Overhalla 4430 4430 4140 4430 4430 4600 4600 
Fosnes 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 3500 3500 
Flatanger 4912 4912 4912 4912 4912 4600 4720 
Vikna 5262 5523 5710 5896 5896 5600 5300 
Nærøy 3961 3961 3961 3961 3961 4600 4720 
Leka 3880 3900 3380 4270 4140 4600 : 
Inderøy (f.o.m. 2012) : : : : : : : 
Bodø 3880 3880 4140 4140 4600 4600 4720 
Narvik 3953 3834 4150 4150 4270 4600 4720 
Bindal 4990 5523 5523 5710 5400 5000 5000 
Sømna 4000 4000 4140 4140 4600 4600 : 
Brønnøy 4800 4800 4800 4800 4800 4800 4800 
Vega 3819 3819 3819 3819 4270 4600 5105 
Vevelstad 5964 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4600 
Herøy (Nordl.) 4086 4100 4100 4100 4270 4270 4270 
Alstahaug 6140 4560 4560 4560 4600 4600 5105 
Leirfjord 4407 4407 4140 4140 4600 4600 5105 
Vefsn 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Grane 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Hattfjelldal 6140 5262 5523 5710 5896 5896 5896 
Dønna 4300 4300 4300 4300 4300 4590 4590 
Nesna 4000 4000 4000 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Hemnes 3990 3990 4140 4140 4600 4600 4720 
Rana 4910 4910 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Lurøy 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Træna 5260 5260 5260 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Rødøy 4624 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Meløy 4050 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Gildeskål 4377 4337 4337 4337 4337 4600 4720 
Beiarn 4000 4000 4000 4000 4270 4600 4720 
Saltdal 5763 4886 4984 4984 5072 5427 5427 
Fauske 4590 4590 4590 4590 4590 5230 5109 
Skjerstad (t.o.m. 2004) 4000 4000 : : : : : 
Sørfold 5763 5763 4900 4900 4900 5345 5480 
Steigen 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
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Hábmer Hamarøy 4000 4000 4140 4140 4600 4600 4720 
Divtasvuodna Tysfjord 4920 4210 4210 4210 4000 4600 4720 
Lødingen 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Tjeldsund 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Evenes 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4720 
Ballangen 4000 4000 4140 4140 4600 4600 4720 
Røst 3880 3880 3880 3880 4270 4270 4720 
Værøy 4920 4920 4920 4920 4920 4920 4920 
Flakstad 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4720 
Vestvågøy 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4720 
Vågan 3742 3742 3742 4140 4270 4270 4720 
Hadsel 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 
Bø (Nordl.) 3650 5090 5090 4620 4620 4790 5025 
Øksnes 3600 3600 3600 4140 4140 4600 4675 
Sortland 4335 4000 4182 3182 4270 4720 4720 
Andøy 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 
Moskenes 4335 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 5105 
Harstad (t.o.m. 2012) 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4600 4720 
Tromsø 3779 3779 4000 4140 4270 4600 5105 
Kvæfjord 4300 4300 4300 4300 4300 4600 4720 
Skånland 3500 3500 3500 3500 4270 4720 4720 
Bjarkøy (t.o.m. 2012) 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4600 4720 
Ibestad 4140 4140 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Gratangen 4000 4000 4140 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Lavangen 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Bardu 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Salangen 3880 3880 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Målselv 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Sørreisa 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Dyrøy 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Tranøy 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Torsken 4000 4000 4140 4270 4270 4600 4720 
Berg 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Lenvik 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Balsfjord 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4600 
Karlsøy 4000 4000 4000 4000 4270 4600 4720 
Lyngen 3456 3456 4140 4270 4600 4600 4720 
Storfjord 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4720 4720 
Gáivuotna Kåfjord 5262 5262 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Skjervøy 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 4600 4720 
Nordreisa 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4600 4720 
Kvænangen 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Vardø 5065 4600 4600 4600 4600 4600 4600 
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Vadsø 4912 4912 4912 8600 9434 10022 10022 
Hammerfest 5224 5224 5224 5396 5542 5542 5887 
Guovdageaidnu 
Kautokeino 3820 3820 3820 3820 4270 4600 5105 
Alta 3880 4768 3880 3880 3880 4100 4100 
Loppa 4400 4400 4400 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Hasvik 3890 3890 3890 3890 3890 4600 4720 
Kvalsund 4400 4400 4554 4554 4697 5060 5192 
Måsøy 4690 4690 4690 4690 4690 4690 4690 
Nordkapp 4692 4692 4690 4692 4690 4600 4720 
Porsanger Porsángu 
Porsanki 5163 4400 4400 4400 4400 4400 4400 
Kárásjohka Karasjok 4000 5763 5763 5763 5763 5376 5105 
Lebesby 5163 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Gamvik 4000 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Berlevåg 4113 4113 4113 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Deatnu Tana 4000 4000 4000 4000 4270 4600 4720 
Unjárga Nesseby 4840 4000 4140 4140 4270 4600 4720 
Båtsfjord 4490 4490 4500 4500 4500 4600 4720 
Sør-Varanger 4335 4335 4335 4335 4335 4335 4335 
         
 
 
